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Abstract 
 
 
Objectives: Tuberculosis(TB) is a serious re-emergent public health problem in the UK. In 
response to rising case incidence a National TB Strain-Typing Service based on molecular 
strain-typing was established.  This facilitates early detection and investigation of clusters, 
targeted public health action, and prevention of further transmission.  We review the added 
public health value of investigating molecular TB strain-typed(ST) clusters. 
 
Methods: A structured questionnaire for each ST cluster investigated in England between 1 
January 2010 and 30 June 2013 was completed. Questions related to epidemiological links 
and public health action and the perceived benefits of ST cluster investigation. 
 
Results: There were 278 ST cluster investigations(CIs) involving 1882 TB cases. Cluster size 
ranged from 2 to 92.  CIs identified new epidemiological links in 36% of clusters; in 18% STs 
were discordant refuting transmission thought to have occurred. Additional public health 
action was taken following 23% of CI. 
 
Conclusions: We found positive benefits of TB molecular ST and CI, in identifying new 
epidemiological links between cases and taking public health action and in refuting 
transmission and saving resources. This needs to be translated to a decrease in transmission 
to provide evidence of public health value in this low prevalence high resource setting.   
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Background  
 
Tuberculosis (TB) is a serious re-emergent public health problem in the United Kingdom (UK). 
Since the late 1980s the incidence of tuberculosis in England steadily increased to a peak of 
15.6 per 100,000 in 2011 (1), higher than most western European countries (2) and nearly five 
times greater than in the United States (3). In response to this rising incidence and the UK 
Chief Medical Officer’s TB Action Plan of 2004 which recommended developing molecular 
typing as a surveillance tool (4), a national prospective molecular strain typing service was 
established. The Tuberculosis Strain Typing Service (TB-STS) was therefore initiated in 2010, 
by Public Health England (PHE), as a key component in helping to control the spread of TB.  
 
The PHE TB-STS aims to support TB control by facilitating early detection and subsequent 
epidemiological cluster investigation leading to targeted public health action. Although 
molecular typing services exist in a number of other countries including the United States of 
America, the Netherlands and Denmark (5,6,7) the TB-STS in England is unique in that it was 
the first universal national prospective service using 24-loci mycobacterium interspersed 
repetitive units variable number tandem repeat (MIRU-VNTR) matched with epidemiological 
surveillance data for those diagnosed with TB (8).  
 
As part of the TB-STS, clusters were investigated by PHE local public health specialists 
supported by National Health Service (NHS) clinical services staff. The aim of a cluster 
investigation was to identify epidemiological links between cases in order to prevent further 
transmission of that TB strain by undertaking enhanced public health action e.g. extended 
contact tracing to identify and treat additional cases of Latent Tuberculosis Infection (LTBI) 
and active TB disease (9).  
 
We aim to describe the additional public health actions and perceived added public health 
value of investigating molecular TB strain-typed (ST) clusters to provide information for 
further development of the national TB-STS and future Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) in 
England. We describe a study of TB cluster investigations (CIs) in England from January 2010 
to June 2013, the reasons why they were initiated, the frequency with which epidemiological 
links were found and the resulting actions undertaken.  
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Method  
 
Cluster Identification and Investigation 
As part of the TB-STS in England molecular typing using 24-loci MIRU-VNTR was carried out 
on all initial TB culture-positive isolates at one of the three reference laboratories in England 
(8). Molecular information was matched to routinely collected case-based epidemiological 
information obtained from the PHE national Enhanced Tuberculosis Surveillance system (ETS) 
(8,9). A decision to investigate a strain-typed cluster was based on pre-agreed criteria 
including size, geographical spread or inclusion of cases which had risk factors suggesting 
potential for higher risk or recent TB transmission (e.g. children, drug resistant cases) (9). CI 
included review of hospital clinic records, and/or patient interviews and standardised CI 
questionnaires. This information was reviewed to determine potential epidemiological links 
and if disease transmission had occurred (9). An incident control team may be established 
consisting of multidisciplinary experts to advise and determine the appropriate course of 
public health actions required (9).  
 
Data collection 
We developed a structured questionnaire, the TB-STS Cluster Investigation Outcome Form to 
be completed by public health staff who investigated a cluster at local, regional or national 
level between 1 January 2010 and 30 June 2013. Details recorded included geography and 
size of the cluster, reason for beginning the investigation (reached a threshold, risk factors 
identified or other), whether epidemiological links were known prior to molecular cluster 
information, whether new epidemiological links were found following molecular cluster 
information, what public health actions were taken, outcome of the CI (probable or definite 
chain of transmission identified, or no apparent transmission, investigation ongoing or 
inconclusive), what factors may have contributed to the cluster, whether the molecular typing 
information was useful and whether it refuted previously suspected epidemiological links.  
 
Data entry 
We developed a Cluster Monitoring Database (CMD) in Microsoft Access. Data on all CIs 
being undertaken was entered together with data from the CI Outcome Form after 
conclusion of the CI.  
 
Data management and analysis 
We performed data consistency checks on key variables from the CI Outcome Form to ensure 
their validity. Any identified discrepancies were followed up with lead investigators. We 
created two new variables derived from information on the CI Outcome Form:  public health 
action taken prior to receipt of ST information, and public health action taken as a 
consequence of CI. Descriptive analysis was undertaken using  Microsoft Excel and Stata 13.1. 
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Definitions 
A ST cluster was defined as two or more cases with indistinguishable 24-loci MIRU-VNTR in 
England (with at least one case with a complete 24-loci profile and others at least 23-loci 
typed). Local clusters were those where all members lived in a single Health Protection Team 
(HPT) area (there were 26 such teams in England); regional clusters were those where cases 
spanned two or more HPTs (though remained within a single region, of which there were 
nine); and national were those containing cases in more than one region. 
Clusters were defined as small if they contained 2-4 cases, medium if contained 5-9 cases and 
large if contained ten or more cases. 
Risk factors(RFs) suggesting potential for higher risk of or recent TB transmission included 
alcohol or drug misuse, history of or currently being homeless or in prison.  
The threshold for investigation was set as five cases in a cluster in the same local HPT or ten 
cases across a region or nationally. Some clusters where cases had RFs  may have been 
investigated when the cluster contained fewer than five cases.  
Epidemiological links were recorded if cases were linked in time and place, and were 
categorised as known or possible links. 
Known epidemiological links were recorded if; 
- one case volunteered the name of another case whilst either was potentially 
infectious (had pulmonary TB irrespective of sputum status), or 
- the cases were in the same setting at the same time when either was potentially 
infectious (9). 
Possible links were recorded if; 
- two cases were in the same place around the same time but the timing of when they 
were there or when they were infectious was not definite, or 
- two cases worked in or were in the same place around the same time and shared 
social, occupational or behavioural characteristics that increased the chances of 
transmission, or 
- two cases were in the same place at the same time but both had non-pulmonary TB, 
or 
- one case volunteered the name of the other as a contact but both had non-pulmonary 
TB (9). 
Probable or definite transmission was deemed to have occurred in a ST cluster if known or 
possible epidemiological links were identified linking members of the cluster, good evidence 
that they were involved in the same chain of recent transmission (9).  
 
Public health action was defined as any action undertaken in addition to standard contact 
tracing, e.g. extended contact tracing and screening of new contacts in response to the cluster 
or any other actions undertaken that would constitute public health action such as awareness 
raising of TB signs and symptoms.  
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The timing of the knowledge of the existence of epidemiological links existing between 
members of the cluster was categorised as either; 
- prior to cluster investigation if the epidemiological link was already known to the 
public health professionals or, 
- as a consequence of cluster investigation if the link between two cases in a cluster was 
elucidated during the process of cluster investigation. 
Clusters may include both epidemiological links known prior to cluster investigation and links 
found as a consequence of cluster investigation.  
Equally the timing of public health action being undertaken was categorised as either prior to 
or as a consequence of molecular cluster investigation. For example, if two cases were linked 
in time and place during standard contact tracing which resulted in extended contact tracing 
being undertaken in the setting identified, this would be public health action prior to cluster 
investigation.  
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Results  
 
Cluster Investigations 
There were 278 TB ST CIs  in England from 1 January 2010 to 30 June 2013 involving 1882 TB 
cases with cluster size ranging from 2 to 92 (median 6). A CI Outcome Form was completed 
for every investigation initiated, a 100% response rate.   
 
Cluster investigations were most frequently (n=150, 54%) initiated within a local health 
protection team, 37% (n=104) were national and 9% (n=24) within a region. Forty percent 
(n=111) of CIs were initiated because the pre-determined threshold for investigation was 
reached. In 27% (n=76), CI were undertaken because at least one case in the cluster had RFs, 
with drug and/or alcohol misuse being the most commonly occurring risk factors. In 8% 
clusters were investigated due to the inclusion of a healthcare worker (n=21) and in 7% due 
to the cluster containing a child (n=20) (Table 1). There were a number of other reasons 
clusters were investigated below the set threshold, these included geographical proximity of 
cases, cluster containing individuals with resistance to one or more first line drugs and cases 
all having the same ethnicity or country of birth. A review meeting was held for nearly all CIs 
(n=275) and a meeting of the incident control team involving allied professionals for nearly a 
quarter (n=61). In 9% of CIs (n=25) additional typing at PHE Mycobacterial Reference 
Laboratories to further differentiate cases was requested, both typing of historical isolates 
which were only previously typed to 12 loci, or further typing of isolates to 32 loci.  
 
Epidemiological Links Identified 
Epidemiological links were identified in 66% (n=184) of clusters investigated. Of these 
clusters with epidemiological links established, 55% (n=101 clusters) had epidemiological 
links as a result of the CI (26% as a consequence of the CI and 29% both as a consequence of 
and prior to the CI) and 45% (n=83) were known prior to the CI (Figure 1). We estimated the 
added epidemiological value of CIs as 36% (101/278) in terms of identifying new 
epidemiological links in clusters.  
 
In 26 (9%) CIs, epidemiological links were found to exist between all members of the cluster. 
The median size of these clusters were three cases. 
In 18% of clusters (n=49), ST results showed cases previously determined, during routine TB 
contact tracing activities, to be epidemiologically linked, had strains with discordant MIRU-
VNTR patterns therefore refuting transmission. 
 
Epidemiological links were identified in 69% (n=103) of local CIs (half of which were identified 
as a consequence of the CI), 61% (n=63) of national investigations, (of which 62% were as a 
result of the CI) and 75% (n=18) of regional investigations (of which 56% were as a result of 
the CI) (Table 1).  
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In clusters investigated because the predefined threshold was reached nearly 80% had 
epidemiological links identified, of which 53% were as a consequence of the CI.  In clusters 
investigated because they contained individuals with RFs for transmission, 57% had 
epidemiological links identified (53% of which were as a consequence of the CI).  In cluster 
investigations initiated because they contained a healthcare worker, 43% had epidemiological 
links identified within the cluster but not necessarily with the healthcare worker, (56% of 
which were as a consequence of the CI). In those investigated because they contained a child 
60% had epidemiological links identified (of which 58% were as a consequence of the CI) 
(Table1).  
 
Public Health Actions Taken 
Public health action was reportedly undertaken (in addition to standard contact tracing) in 91 
(46%) of 200 CIs with this information. In 34 (37%)  this was as a consequence of the CI; in 46 
(51%) sufficient public health action had already been undertaken prior to the CI and in 11 
(12%) action was taken both prior to, and as a consequence of, the CI (Figure 2). Overall we 
found 23% (45/200) of clusters had additional public health actions undertaken as a 
consequence of CIs (Table 2).  
 
In twelve out of these 45 clusters where public health action was undertaken as a 
consequence of the CIs, the number of additional cases identified was reported. Overall 1517 
additional contacts were identified and screened (628 from one cluster) following cluster 
investigation, this led to the identification of 23 active and 136 latent cases.  
 
In CIs initiated because of reaching the predefined threshold, 43% resulted in additional public 
health action being undertaken as a consequence of the CI compared to 75% of those initiated 
because they contained individuals with RFs for transmission (Table 2).  
 
Occurrence of Transmission 
Transmission occurred more often in large compared to small clusters  (82% in large clusters, 
47% in small clusters) (p<0.05)  and additional public health action, as a consequence of CI, 
was more likely to be undertaken in large compared to small clusters (51% in large clusters, 
30% in small clusters) (p<0.05) (Table 1,2).  
 
Probable or definite transmission was reported to have occurred in 180 (65%) CIs, no 
apparent transmission in 73 (26%), investigations were inconclusive in 16 (6%) and in 9 (3%) 
investigations were ongoing (Table 1).  
 
Health protection staff who responded to the question (n=187) stated what factors they 
believed contributed to transmission; in 63% (n=117) of CIs no factors were identified, in 14% 
(n=27) transmission was considered to have occurred due to inadequate identification of, and 
screening of, contacts of early cases, in 9% (n=16) transmission was reportedly due to a lack 
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of co-operation with contact tracing of the early cases in the cluster, 8% (n=15) due to delayed 
diagnosis of early cases and 6% (n=12) for other reasons.  
 
Utility of ST information  
The ST data was deemed useful by public health staff leading the investigations in nearly 80% 
of investigations, where reported (207/260). 
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Discussion and Conclusions  
 
We report a high level of potential benefit to local health professionals of molecular TB strain-
typing in England. Our study during 2010 to 2013 showed that 278 clusters were investigated 
and new epidemiological links were identified in 36% of clusters, resulting in additional public 
health action being undertaken in 23% of clusters and in 18% of clusters, investigation refuted 
links previously thought to exist. 
 
This proportion of new epidemiological links discovered is comparable to the 38-57% of 
epidemiological linkages identified in clusters (varying on strength of epidemiological 
association) across four sentinel sites in the United States of America (USA) in 1998-2000(10). 
Although their proportion was based on cluster pairs and a different molecular method, 
restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP), was used. Similarly in the Netherlands, also 
using the RFLP molecular method, researchers found that 31% of clustered cases had a new 
epidemiological link established after cluster feedback (11).  
 
The proportion of clusters with true epidemiological links between cases may be higher than 
identified. Cases may deliberately or innocently withhold information regarding links to 
others, particularly those with prison history or problems with drug misuse due to the 
misconception of implication in potential illegal activities; this can result in ongoing 
transmission in specific populations and a failure to identify the connection between cases 
(12,13).  
 
In 18% of clusters, investigation refuted links previously thought to exist. This is very useful 
since it enables limited public health resources to be targeted elsewhere. Research from the 
USA reports that 29% of links identified and thought to exist during standard contact tracing 
were disproved after molecular typing became available(10,14). Conversely the Netherlands 
research reported that just 5% of links identified prior to the availability of molecular 
information were disproved (11). The validity of comparisons remains problematic however 
due to the use of different molecular techniques and should be further explored with 
differing definitions of a cluster. Additionally the use of more sophisticated laboratory 
methods, such as whole genome sequencing which has been shown to have a higher 
discriminatory power (15),  to determine clustering will be  key in further understanding the 
evidence for transmission. 
 
The time taken for culture diagnosis, DNA extraction, performance of and receipt of ST results 
inevitably leads to a delay in CI initiation and lost opportunity for any additional public health 
action.  Early cases in a cluster are likely to have completed treatment and can be difficult to 
trace again to interview as part of an investigation (14). The challenge of minimising delays in 
diagnosis of TB cases by identifying and screening contacts was highlighted as the main factor 
to have contributed to cluster growth in more than one in five clusters.  Following a 
comprehensive evaluation it has been reported that the TB-STS had no significant effect on 
reducing diagnostic delay (16). However this evaluation utilised data from the early part of 
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the service, the first three years, therefore it was less likely to find evidence. Work in the USA 
indicated that linkages discovered only during cluster investigation were more likely to be in 
non-traditional settings (defined as those not including home, school, workplace and common 
congregate settings such as correctional facilities, day-care centres nursing homes) and non-
traditional relationships (defined as to not include household, friend and co-worker contacts) 
(10, 17) than during conventional contact tracing. We recommend that sufficient time is given 
for interviews with patients to build rapport and enable effective contact tracing to be carried 
out so that epidemiological links can be established and any foci for enhanced transmission 
identified. In addition investment should be made in epidemiological skill training and 
capacity building to enhance investigation skills.  
 
If limited public health resources are to be targeted well, then clusters where there is the 
greatest potential for added public health value need to be prioritised for investigation.  The 
proportion of CIs with new links identified was 42% in those investigated because the 
threshold for investigation was reached, which translated to additional public health action 
being undertaken in 21% of these. New epidemiological links were identified in 35% of 
clusters containing a child or children with additional public health action in 16%, and 30% in 
clusters containing individuals with risk factors resulting in additional public health action 
reportedly being undertaken in 44% of these clusters.  We recommend clusters with these 
characteristics be prioritised for investigation on the basis of likely higher yield of previously 
unknown epidemiological links. The additional knowledge gained on the basis of ST CI has 
previously been reported as limited (7). While additional public health action being 
undertaken as a result of strain type cluster investigations for only 23% of clusters may initially 
appear low, if this additional action led to a reduction in TB transmission, it may have led to 
public health benefit. 
 
Limitations 
The existence of epidemiological links were locally determined. We were unable to validate 
epidemiological links stated to exist nor to confirm the exact timing of any public health 
interventions in relation to timing of receipt of ST results. Further, the unit of investigation 
was cluster, rather than case, therefore it was not defined who within the cluster the 
epidemiological links were between. Future work should investigate the nature of the 
epidemiological links and describe them in more detail. We were only able to establish if 
public health actions taken led to the identification and treatment of additional cases of latent 
TB infection or active TB in a limited number of clusters. This information needs to be better 
collected in the future as evidence for prevention of further transmission. 
 
Quantifying the added epidemiological value in prospective strain typing cluster 
investigations is not straightforward.  Although a standard method of investigation was 
recommended in England (in the national strain typing handbook) (9) we know that there 
were variations in intensity of investigation which could have led to a detection bias in 
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determining epidemiological links. Funding was not provided, as part of the TB-STS, to the 
NHS TB Services for any extra workload resulting from gathering additional information from 
patients as part of cluster investigations. There is the possibility that with additional resources 
further epidemiological links may have been elucidated due to the additional time an 
individual could spend investigating the cluster. We believe it is likely, therefore, that the 
estimates of clusters with true epidemiological links found as a result of cluster investigations 
are an under- rather than an over- estimation. We recommend that cluster investigations are 
carried out and actions and outcomes should continue to be recorded in a systematic manner 
to ensure continued public health review and quality assurance.   
 
The usefulness of strain typing information was a personal opinion of the public health 
workers leading the investigation, it was subjective and therefore difficult to measure the 
interpretation. This has previously been reported as high (18). 
 
Given the level of resolution of genetic relatedness provided by MIRU-VNTR, clustering  does 
not necessarily signify recent transmission (19-21), as some MIRU-VNTR clusters investigated 
will have been false positive transmission clusters. The higher level of resolution provided by 
Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) of TB strains should increase the utility of cluster 
investigation (18). In addition, it is hoped that WGS will increase the timeliness of molecular 
characterisation of strains from the laboratory perspective which should improve the speed 
with which public health action can be initiated (19).  
 
Conclusion 
We found positive benefits in both TB molecular strain typing and cluster investigation in 
England. Both in terms of identifying new epidemiological links between cases and taking 
public health action, and conversely in refuting transmission and saving limited public health 
resources. The public health benefit is evidenced in the reported cases identified following 
cluster investigations however the additional public health benefit in terms of reduced 
onward transmission of TB needs further quantification in order to provide convincing 
evidence of public health value.  
Indicators of such benefit might include reduced diagnostic delay through earlier 
identification of active cases (shortened intervals from onset to diagnosis or treatment of 
those contacts who are found to have active TB), through contact investigations in strain type 
cluster investigations compared to other active cases detected through routine contact 
tracing, as well as higher rates of LTBI detection and prophylaxis.  
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Table and Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Cluster investigations carried out, epidemiological links reportedly identified as a 
consequence of or prior to Strain Typed Cluster Investigations, TB Strain Typing Outcomes England 
January 2010- June 2013  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Cluster investigations carried out, public health action taken as a consequence of or prior 
to Strain Typed Cluster Investigations, TB Strain Typing Outcomes England January 2010- June 2013  
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Variable Total no. of clusters 
Percentage (no.) of 
clusters with epi 
links established 
Percentage (no.) links 
found due to CI (of 
those with epi links) 
Added epidemiological 
value of cluster 
investigations 
Percentage (no.) with 
probable or definite 
transmission 
      All cluster investigations 278 66%   (184) 55%   (101) 36% 65%   (180) 
Geographical footprint of investigation           
      Local 150 69%  (103) 50%   (52) 35% 67%  (100) 
      Regional 24 75%    (18) 56%   (10) 42% 75%    (18) 
      National 104 61%   (63) 62%   (39) 38% 60%   (62) 
Size of cluster investigated           
      Small (2-4 cases) 100 48%   (48) 52%   (25) 25% 47%   (47) 
      Medium (5-9 cases) 91 69%   (63) 54%   (34) 37% 68%   (62) 
      Large (≥10 cases) 87 84%   (73) 58%   (42) 48% 82%   (71) 
Reason cluster investigated           
Threshold reached 111 79%   (88) 53%   (47) 42% 77%   (86) 
Contained individual(s) with risk factors 76 57%   (43) 53%   (23) 30% 55%   (42) 
Contained HCW(s) 21 43%      (9) 56%     (5) 24% 43%     (9) 
Contained Child(ren) 20 60%    (12) 58%     (7) 35% 55%   (11) 
Other 50 64%    (32) 59%   (19) 38% 64%   (32) 
 
 
Table 1: Number and percentage of clusters investigated, with epidemiological links identified, the resulting added epidemiological value and transmission 
thought to have occurred according to geographical footprint, size of cluster, and reason for the cluster investigation, TB Strain Typing Outcomes England 
January 2010- June 2013 
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Variable Total no. of clusters 
No. of clusters with 
information on public 
health actions taken*  
Percentage (no.) of 
clusters where public 
health action undertaken 
Percentage (no.) of clusters 
with additional public health 
action taken due to CI 
      All cluster investigations 278 200 46% (91) 23% (45) 
Geographical footprint of investigation         
      Local 150 150 41%   (61) 14% (21) 
      Regional 24 24 33%   (8) 8% (2) 
      National 104 26 85%   (22) 85% (22) 
Size of cluster investigated         
      Small (2-4 cases) 100 76 38%   (29) 30% (12) 
      Medium (5-9 cases) 91 67 48%   (32) 36% (14) 
      Large (≥10 cases) 87 57 53%   (30) 51% (19) 
Reason cluster investigated         
Threshold reached 111 91 48%   (44) 21% (19) 
Contained individual(s) with risk factors 76 34 59%   (20) 44% (15) 
Contained HCW(s) 21 19 21%     (4) 11% (2) 
Contained Child(ren) 20 19 47%     (9) 16% (3) 
Other 50 37 38%   (14) 16% (6) 
* information unknown for 78  clusters       
 
Table 2: Number and percentage of clusters investigated, with public health action taken and the resulting added public health value according to 
geographical footprint, size of cluster and reason for the cluster investigation, TB Strain Typing Outcomes England January 2010- June 2013 
 
